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The International Labour Organization’s Domestic Worker Convention, resolved in 
June 2011 and soon to come into force, is regarded as a watershed in the struggle by a 
host of civil society groups to get paid domestic work formally recognised, draw such 
work out of the shadows and secure employment rights and protections for this 
overwhelmingly female workforce. In covering all paid domestic work, the Convention 
can also be seen as an important initiative in promoting decent work for migrant workers 
and especially the many recruited from Southeast Asia and South Asia. However, 
improvements in employment rights and conditions will likely be frustrated by the 
inadequacies of the ILO as a global institutional force able to engage member nation 
states as well as by the entrenched structural inequities in international labour markets 
marked by barriers based on gender, race and ethnicity, nationality and religion and 
irregular employment. Progress will depend on the effectiveness of those civil society 
groups which were instrumental in the negotiation of the Convention to maintain the 
momentum to break down the barriers and states’ reluctance to implement measures that 
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More than six years in the making, the adoption of the Convention on Domestic 
Work (C189) at the 100th Session of the International Labour Organization’s General 
Conference in June 2011 marks an important moment in the struggles to draw paid 
domestic work out of the shadows into the mainstream. Because it pertains to all paid 
employment undertaken in households, the Domestic Work Convention provides a 
critical springboard for negotiating improvements in working conditions for the large 
number of women recruited from South East Asia and South Asia as foreign domestic 
workers. Since its fundamental purpose is to formally recognise this occupation be treated 
on terms comparable to other forms of paid work, the Convention provides an 
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instrument designed to redress the multiple disadvantages faced by the disproportionate 
number of migrant women workers engaged in paid domestic and care work. The 
Convention in general and specific clauses designed to meet the particular circumstances 
and concerns of migrant workers, and a series of supplementary Recommendations, seek 
to remedy the disadvantage that flows from being employed in an occupation that is 
generally not regarded as work, the discrimination associated with the female-dominated 
occupation and shortcomings related to terms of employment and remuneration. A range 
of other dimensions of the disadvantage experienced by migrant women could also be 
tackled. These include the discrimination based on race and ethnicity, nationality and 
religion; the isolated nature of domestic work, which leaves workers subject to a range of 
abuses and which can frustrate efforts for workers to organise; the restrictions that arise 
with the limited-term nature of employment for most foreign domestic workers, and; the 
disadvantage that follows from being separated from family and other origin-country 
cultural and institutional supports. Insofar as the Convention provides a prescription for 
the definition of the terms and conditions for all workers who are employed in domestic 
employment, it provides a particularly important instrument for challenging the 
vulnerability and labour market disadvantage of foreign domestic workers. 
The Convention calls upon member states to provide all employed domestic 
workers, including migrant workers, with contracts that specify the terms and conditions 
of employment and remuneration arrangements, to mandate weekly rest days and the 
right to a safe and healthy working environment, and to establish measures to combat 
abuse by employment agencies as employers. In advocating that host country 
governments afford domestic workers conditions no less favourable than those applying 
to local workers, the Convention reinforces the principles outlined in several other ILO 
and international Conventions to extend the reach of employment and related human 
rights to a category of work that generally enjoys few standard protections.1   
There is, thus, much to be celebrated in the conclusion of the Domestic Workers 
Convention for the many migrant women engaged in domestic work. The Convention is 
a significant development because it is a product of the shift in thinking that has become 
encapsulated in the ‘rights-based’ discourse. In the ILO’s ‘decent work’ agenda this has 
focused the concern with employment rights as also requiring an engagement with 
human rights. When considered as a complement to other key ILO and international 
conventions, ratification of C189 and the adoption of relevant regulatory frameworks by 
labour-export and labour-import states could go some way to redressing the principal 
manifestations of labour market disadvantage. 
My research, based on field work interviews conducted with migrant worker 
advocacy and other support groups and migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong, the 
Philippines, Singapore, India and Sri Lanka, and Greece and Italy over the period 2001 
to 2012, suggests that there is cause for some caution in investing too much confidence 
in the Convention as a solution for redressing the disadvantage experienced by foreign 
domestic workers. My research has been focused on the different organising strategies 
and struggles that have been waged to establish and strengthen regulations governing 
labour migration and employment conditions and rights for migrant domestic workers. 
C189 is one of the institutional products of these struggles, somewhat of an offshoot 
from campaigns focused on labour-export and labour-import states and the various 
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responses of these states. I reflect on these before appraising the efficacy of C189 as an 
instrument for progressing the rights and employment status of migrant domestic 
workers.  
I contend that there are several reasons for qualifying the achievement of the 
Convention, and I argue three in particular warrant consideration. The first relates to the 
limitations of a tripartite negotiation process in which outcomes are contingent upon the 
agreement being struck by the employer, worker and government representatives who 
rarely agree on the form let alone the need for employment regulations. The second 
follows from this and relates to the ILO’s lack of purchase as a global institutional force, 
evident in the lack of traction of ILO Conventions, both with respect to securing 
member states support in ratifying conventions and in terms of the Organization’s 
limited capacity to monitor and enforce conventions. This is examined in the broader 
context of the ILO’s mandate to endeavour to secure employment rights and protections 
for workers in the context of global labour markets that are structurally inequitable and 
which in the nation-state system, and especially that associated with the labour exports 
states of Southeast Asia and South Asia, inscribe a particular disadvantage for low skilled 
migrant workers. In a final section I return to reflect on the political force of the civil 
society groups and unions, the catalysts in moving forward the negotiations on the 
Domestic Worker Convention, and their capacity to break down resistance to advancing 
the rights and protections afforded migrant domestic workers.  
 
 
Contesting Gendered Labour Market Disadvantage 
The drafting of C189 is the product of a remarkable confluence of forces that 
places it in a unique position in the history of the labour movement. The struggle to have 
paid domestic work recognised as an occupation that should be subject to regulation on 
terms comparable to other waged work has a long history. It figured in debate within the 
ILO in the immediate post-World War Two, although there was no movement to 
formally recognise the status of domestic workers employment, and the consequence was 
that most ILO Conventions explicitly excluded domestic workers from the protections 
afforded by most employment Conventions.  It was not until the new millennium, when 
the ILO began to engage with the issue of migrant workers, that the particular needs of 
paid domestic workers were taken up (Demaret 2007).   
The employment status of domestic workers became a matter of interest as a 
result of greater recourse to paid domestic work over the course of the 1970s and 1980s 
with increasing female labour force participation, particularly in advanced industrial 
countries, and the changing demographics of familial organisation. Domestic and care 
work are overwhelmingly female-dominated occupations with next to no regulations 
governing terms and conditions of employment especially with respect to migrant 
workers. From the 1980s and more especially into the 1990s, there was a dramatic 
increase in the employment of migrant women as domestic workers. Recruited from an 
ever-growing number of countries from the South, race and ethnicity and nationality 
contributed to the definition of this labour force and labour market disadvantage. But the 
countries of Southeast Asia and South Asia stand out as major source countries because 
governments have promoted such labour migration. 
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The established organs of the labour movement generally exhibited little interest 
in addressing the employment position of domestic workers. The impetus for challenging 
this situation originated mostly from outside the mainstream of the labour movement 
with a diverse range of social forces emerging to ignite struggles across a number of 
political domains.2 They brought with them a quite unique and dynamic character to the 
struggle for women’s labour rights that helped to underscore the momentum of the 
struggle. Especially in Europe and the United States, advocacy initially concentrated on 
endeavours to formally recognise the position of paid domestic workers (Anderson 2000; 
Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Lutz 2008; Schwenken 2005). But, with greater recourse to 
paid domestic work in an ever-growing number of countries and the ever-increasing 
number of migrant workers employed as domestic workers, non-government 
organisations, women’s groups and migrant rights advocacy organisations moved to draw 
attention to conditions of employment and work-related abuses and to lobby for 
employment protections. An intriguing confluence of forces was set in train to generate a 
dramatic re-orientation in how labour movement practices and strategies were pursued.  
This was especially the case across Southeast Asia. Non-government and civil 
rights organisations and faith-based groups worked, and continue to do so, alongside 
migrant worker advocacy groups to promote the rights of workers. In the Philippines, 
one of the largest source countries for domestic workers, campaigning was initially 
concentrated on the position of Filipina workers, based on advocacy work that was taken 
up in host – or labour-import – countries and in campaigns within the Philippines that 
focused on lobbying for more government protection.  
With a considerable diversity of destinations, the growing global reliance upon 
foreign domestic work also added another unique dimension, a cross-border or 
transnational and even internationalist orientation, to advocacy and organising 
endeavours. This was particularly the case among the organisations and groupings 
involving Filipina workers, especially in several European states and parts of Southeast 
Asia. These cross-border alliances and associations were founded on an internationalism 
that was considerably more tangible than was evident in the mainstream labour 
movement.3 This sometimes took the form of transnational networks, such as Kalayaan, 
or more consciously internationalist movements, most notably Migrante International. 
There were also less formally constituted associations, often organised on the basis of 
personal transnational networks, such as those pursued through religious institutions.4 
They linked with others to consolidate transnational lobbying efforts. For example, 
Kalayaan in Europe joined with the European migrant domestic worker network, 
RESPECT, and SOLIDAR, the Brussels-based labour movement NGO, and pressed 
unions to support employment rights for migrant domestic workers. They also lobbied 
European parliamentarians and the European Commission resulting in the European 
Parliament conducting a public hearing on ‘Regulating Domestic Help in the Informal 
Sector’ in 2000. 
In Southeast Asia, there was an inherently transnational character to advocacy 
and campaign work, based initially on the national origin of migrant workers, and this 
has been underscored by initiatives to assist other migrant women workers to form their 
own associations. The Asian Migrant Centre, the Hong Kong-based advocacy and 
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research centre, drew on the model of the well-organised Filipina workers’ union to 
support the formation of an Indonesian migrant workers union.  
These efforts were a precursor to the more ambitious objective of bringing 
together migrant domestic workers from all origins to form the Asian Domestic Workers 
Union in Hong Kong in 1989. This particular coalition was not without its tensions, 
mostly because it was dominated by Filipina members much to the chagrin of other 
nationalities, and the Union did not survive these. The Coalition of Domestic Workers 
Unions, a new grouping, was formed in 1998 and, more inclusive, has proved more 
enduring (Swider 2006). The European network for migrant domestic workers, 
RESPECT, has been a force to reckon with, as has the more globally-focused Women in 
Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) in more recent times. 
These transnational and internationalist tendencies were consolidated with the 
formation of regional advocacy forums and networks. Reflecting the numerical 
significance of women from Southeast Asia recruited into the global labour market, Asia 
became a notable crucible for these. The Asian Domestic Workers Network was formed 
in 2005 following the Asian Domestic Workers forum held in Hong Kong in 2004. The 
Network was organised by the Committee for Asian Women (CAW) and the lobby 
groups United for Foreign Domestic Workers Rights, the Asia Pacific Forum on 
Women, Law and Development and CARAM Asia. Aspirations to cement a truly global 
transnational alliance came together with the formation of the International Domestic 
Workers Network.  
The advocacy of rights for migrant domestic workers was a natural corollary of 
the burgeoning women’s movements across the region, and, as a focal point of concern, 
the cross-border exchanges strengthened the momentum in the development of 
transnational advocacy of worker rights as a gender-based concern. The force of this was 
reinforced by feminist activists and researchers becoming engaged in the cause of migrant 
domestic workers. One result of this engagement was that the significance of this paid 
domestic work undertaken by migrants became the subject of a remarkably extensive 
body of research.5 In documenting the undervaluing of paid domestic work and the 
precarious and vulnerable position of migrant workers, this research made the case for 
regulating employment conditions and for setting standards.  
The scale of this research endeavour can be attributed to a number of factors. The 
active participation, indeed encouragement, of migrant worker advocates and workers 
themselves to document and publicise the significance of domestic work was crucial. The 
readiness of Filipina workers, in particular, to be the subjects of research was somewhat 
strategic, motivated by the desire to engage more voices to advance their cause.6 The 
extent of the research output also reflected the growing traction of feminist critique, 
while the analysis of domestic work proved a fertile ground for exploring different 
research methodologies and tendencies within feminist discourse. Moreover, the activist 
bent of this research agenda, with researchers involved in organising and lobbying 
campaigns, underscored the research drive. Needless to say, the migrant domestic worker 
research agenda helped to position the situation of migrant domestic workers within 
international policy debate. It both informed and impelled the research and policy 
preoccupations of those international agencies that had a specific mandate to advance the 
position of women, and most notably UN Women, formerly UNIFEM, and the ILO.7 
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The International Organisation for Migration, which has been resistant to supporting 
efforts to regulate recruitment and employment conditions, felt obliged to enter the 
debate to protect the rights of migrant workers, although it has generally approached the 
issue of women’s employment rights as a trafficking management concern.  
These various efforts strengthened the voice of migrant women workers and had a 
catalytic effect in stimulating increasing dialogue within peak union councils and the 
international labour movement over the course of the 1990s and into the 2000s. The 
support of the trade union movement, and especially the IUF8 and the European Trade 
Union Confederation, proved crucial in building on the European Parliament’s 
engagement with domestic worker rights. The ETUC 2005 conference Out of the 
Shadow: Organising Domestic Workers. Towards A Protective Regulatory Framework for 
Domestic Work, organised in conjunction with the International Restructuring Education 
Network Europe (IRENE) and the Platform for International Cooperation on 
Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), underscored the momentum of the campaign for 
introducing measures to regulate domestic work (Mather 2005). The Convention was 
also a natural corollary of the ILO’s Decent Work for Migrant Workers agenda. But it must 
also be seen as the product of campaigns that were pursued across a range of institutional 
and political contexts. The governments of labour-export countries and labour-import 
countries have been subjected to the unrelenting lobbying of these groups. In those 
instances where civil society groups have little or no political traction, and most obviously 
in the Gulf states, the exercise of some political leverage to influence labour migration 
policy and employment practices has quite often been taken up by UN Women 
(formerly UNIFEM) and/or the ILO.  
 
 
Labour-export States’ Policy Responses to Protect Migrant Workers 
Labour migration has been a key component of economic policy for most 
governments across Southeast Asia and South Asia. Migrant workers earnings have 
become one of the largest sources of foreign exchange earnings for many economies in 
the region. With women making up a numerically significant proportion of these 
workers – over half of the Philippines’ workers and a disproportionately greater number 
of Sri Lanka’s and Indonesia’s migrant workforces – and the great majority working as 
foreign domestic workers, the earnings from working in the hidden occupation women 
workers account for a large share of remittance flows to these countries.  
The development of labour export programs were largely the product of 
government initiatives. Most have set up some form of framework to facilitate 
recruitment and oversee the migration process, but throughout Southeast Asia and South 
Asia these functions have been assumed by private agencies that now manage the 
recruitment and training, assistance in securing funds to meet the costs of migration, and 
the overseas placement of workers. Notwithstanding the privatisation of the labour trade, 
governments, needless to say, retain vested interest in maintaining the flow of migrant 
women workers, and governments have come under intense political pressure to adopt 
measures to ameliorate the abuse of migrant domestic workers that continues to plague 
the industry. Initial responses, the evidence suggests, were somewhat desultory or, at 
least, proved to be so. However, over time, and partly in response to concerns about the 
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loss of national prestige, more concerted efforts to regulate employment terms and 
conditions have been pursued. For instance, the Philippines and Indonesia in particular, 
and Sri Lanka to a lesser extent, mandated requirements that prospective workers 
complete pre-departure programs to better acquaint workers with the work demands that 
would be required of them as well as with their employment rights. Several governments 
have appointed labour attachés or designated officers in embassy and consular offices to 
represent the interests of migrant workers, and a number of ‘safe houses’ have been 
established providing sanctuary for women workers fleeing abusive employers (Baruah 
and Chettri 2012; CARAM 2011).9 The Philippines and Indonesia governments have 
designed employment contracts that stipulate minimum remuneration and employment 
conditions that must be signed before exit visas can be issued. From time to time, 
individual governments have banned agencies that do not comply with transparent 
recruitment procedures or that fail to protect foreign domestic workers from abuses.10        
Over the years there have been a number of attempts to restrict the recruitment 
of women for foreign domestic work. The governments of the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Sri Lanka have banned recruitment for employment in countries in the Gulf states and 
Southeast Asia. Other South Asia governments have been more determined to restrict or 
prohibit women’s migration, partly in response to reported abuses and, in the case of 
Nepal, the realisation that it did not have the resources to manage women’s migration, 
but also on religious and patriarchal grounds in the instances of Bangladesh and Pakistan 
(Afsar 2005; Raghuram 2005). In 1999 the Indian government banned the deployment 
of women for domestic work in Kuwait because of the record of abuses. In 2002 it 
introduced a minimum age requirement for women engaged as foreign domestic workers, 
of 30 years, and mandated a $US2500 security deposit to be paid by employers as an exit 
visa requirement, and this largely extinguished documented migration (Rajan, Varghese 
and Kumar 2011). 
However, rather than stop the migration of women, such restrictions appear to 
generated irregular labour flows or undocumented migration. Unauthorised cross-border 
movement is significant, and more especially among some of those worker cohorts who 
are among the lowest paid, such as those from Nepal and Bangladesh (Sarker 2012).11 
Governments have had little success in stemming undocumented migration, and the 
bureaucratic requirements and systemic corruption in the migration bureaucracies of the 
Philippines, India and Indonesia, aided by corrupt or unlicensed recruitment agents and 
supportive counterparts in destination countries, only serves to add to the scale of the 
irregular flow of women workers (Sim and Wee 2009; Rajan, Varghese and Kumar 2011; 
Sihaloho 2012; Tan 2012). Employing undocumented workers can be to the employer’s 
advantage – the great majority of Malaysian employers apparently preferring to employ 
‘illegal or “express” foreign maids because they are cheaper than through [recruited 
through] proper channels’ (Looi, Goha and Raman 2009). Moreover, there is a strong 
impetus for workers to seek overseas employment through irregular channels because of 
the time-consuming and expensive nature of authorised employment processes. And the 
nature of most migrant women’s work, conducted in the private realm of the employer’s 
residence provides a haven for the undocumented migrant – as well as a space largely 
sheltered from what protective measures exist (Moors and de Regt 2008). Nor is irregular 
migration and employment a peculiarly Asian phenomenon; it is global and as such 
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draws Asia’s migrant women workers onto the global stage (Corpuz 2011; de Regt 2010; 
Raijman, Schamman-Gasser and Kemp 2003; Young 2001). The contemptuous attitude 
of the governments of some destination countries to the efforts by labour-export 
countries to stem irregular movement, such as Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, only serves to 
help institutionalise undocumented migration (Nie 2012; cawinfo 2012).12  
This is not to argue that there has not been any progress in labour-export states’ 
attempts to regulate employment and labour migration standards. On the contrary, 
governments have successfully negotiated Memorandums of Understanding with a 
number of Gulf states to formalise standards, although some of these do tend to be 
somewhat opaque and the promises of protection afforded by such agreements does not 
necessarily translate into concrete measures.13 The UAE introduced a written unified 
contract for domestic workers that stipulates the duration of contract, salary and other 
benefits, accommodation, healthcare, working hours, paid leave, repatriation ticket, 
disputes settlement, recruitment fees, and coordination with concerned embassies. 
Subsequently, a 24-hour hotline and complaint website was set up for migrant workers, 
and stiff penalties were gazetted for anyone facilitating the employment of 
undocumented workers (Migrant Forum in Asia 2010). Domestic workers, however, 
remain expressly excluded from the protection of labour law. Some Gulf and Middle East 
states are considering amending the kafala system, which indents migrant workers to a 
private sponsor. This follows concerted efforts by the ILO, and Bahrain has announced it 
will replace the system of sponsoring migrant workers with a state authority. Other Gulf 
states are now also reflecting on changing the system, although others continue to resist 
making any changes (Kahn and Harrof-Tavel 2011).14  
The object of much criticism from migrant worker activists, the Singaporean 
government has been endeavouring to improve that country’s image as an employer of 
foreign domestic workers and has pursued a range of measures to stop the abuse of 
domestic workers. The government has resolved to introduce legislation similar to Hong 
Kong and Taiwan that would afford foreign domestic workers a day off. This would take 
effect from 1 January 2013, but would only apply to new recruits, and the legislation 
mirrors that of Taiwan insofar as it allows employers and workers to negotiate away the 
day of rest, which is a concern because in Taiwan only around 5 percent of migrant 
domestic workers actually have a regular day off (Lok-Sin 2011). In promising to adopt 
measures to afford some protection for workers, even some recruitment agencies are 
responding to criticisms and the threat that governments will restrict women’s overseas 
employment if they do not improve their practices and oversight of employment 
conditions.  
There are, then, some positive developments, and the passage of the Domestic 
Worker Convention must be regarded as a factor in this. However, it is evident that 
efforts to progress migrant domestic worker rights through bilateral agreements will have 
limited traction given the ability of labour-import economies to source labour needs from 
an ever-growing number of countries. The desire to contain the costs of labour and to 
meet increasing demand for domestic workers has prompted labour-import countries, 
such as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore to expand the number of countries from 
which domestic workers are recruited (Migrant Rights International 2012; Nee 2011).15   
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The global nature of the challenge is exacerbated by the pressure on governments 
in the South to follow the prompting of the World Bank to establish labour-export 
programs as an export revenue earning strategy. The consequences of this are neatly 
illustrated across Asia, and especially by the case of Nepal which thought it had secured a 
niche in negotiating a labour migration accord with Malaysia following the Bangladeshi 
government’s decision to ban the migration of women workers to Malaysia. The accord 
would have resulted in Nepalese workers becoming among the lowest paid and most 
poorly treated migrant workers, but the arrangement evaporated when Bangladesh 
announced its intention to lift the ban (Klep 2011; Loh 2011; Smith-Gary 2011).16 
Competition between states to secure employment opportunities presents a systemic 
obstacle to efforts to negotiate conditions and remuneration standards for domestic 
workers. This is obviously compounded by the extent of recourse to undocumented 




The Institutional Weakness of the ILO Tripartite Framework 
The negotiation of the ILO Convention on Domestic Work does mark an 
important step in the endeavour to recognise domestic workers in the mainstream of the 
labour force. The tripartite ILO framework that brought representatives of employers, 
workers and governments coming together, and thus signalling the preparedness to 
negotiate an accord that would afford some protection and minimum standards for 
domestic workers, provided a potential means for overcoming some of the hurdles that 
have marred efforts by labour-export states and migrant advocacy groups to progress 
agreements on employment conditions with individual labour-import countries. 
Moreover, the momentum of the deliberations of the Committee drafting the 
Convention on Domestic Work s was bolstered with the participation of several advocacy 
groups, in a notable shift in practice, and Worker representatives included domestic 
workers in their delegations (ILO 2011c).17 
However, there were marked differences over the form the ILO instrument 
should take and the extent to which it should specify standards. Employer and some 
government representatives preferred formulating a Recommendation, rather than a 
Convention, that would guide standards and regulation setting (ILC 2010). Pressured 
into conceding that a Convention would be concluded, they then stressed the importance 
of designing an instrument that provided flexibility and diversity, that would not be too 
prescriptive and which should accommodate national circumstances, and these 
sentiments were reflected in the final draft (ILO 2011b; ILO 2011c).18 The 
Recommendations, negotiated as a supplement to C189, do provide greater definition of 
employment rights and entitlements as well as member state obligations, although even 
these retain the inclination to provide for flexibility in the regulation of domestic work.  
The Convention might well have launched a springboard for bringing domestic 
work into the mainstream, although it does so in an extremely tentative way, and this is 
all the more so with respect to institutionalising the rights of migrant domestic workers. 
In large measure this is simply the consequence of the difficulties of negotiating an accord 
that sought to break new ground in context of the tripartite ILO process. But the 
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shortcomings of C189 are more deeply rooted than this because they are reflective of 
fundamental limitations of the ILO’s organisational charter and how the ILO has 
endeavoured to respond to these limitations.  
The tripartite framework certainly impedes progress on negotiating of 
employment conventions, but unlike other international economic institutions the ILO’s 
resolutions do not have the same legal force or political purchase as those that are 
concluded by, for instance and most obviously the IMF, the World Bank and the World 
Trade Organization. The negotiation of resolutions within the ILO framework traverses a 
more difficult passage than occurs within these other institutions, and there is no 
obligation on or compulsion for member states to ratify ILO Conventions. Even when 
adopted there are limited effective mechanisms for sanctioning states that do not adhere 
to a Convention’s obligations, and the ILO has limited resources that impair its capacity 
to monitor, police, let alone enforce member state commitments to Conventions (Alston 
2004). Notwithstanding a convention coming into force, the standards set out in ILO 
Conventions only apply in those countries which ratify the relevant convention. The ILO 
simply does not have the leverage that other international economic institutions are able 
to exercise. 
The record on Convention ratifications highlights the real weakness in the ILO’s 
standing, and this is most apparent with respect to Conventions pertaining to labour 
migration. The Philippines is the only member state that promotes labour migration to 
have ratified the Migration for Employment Convention, 1949 (C97) and Migrant Workers 
(Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (143), although Indonesia has indicated an 
intention to ratify C97, while not one major destination country that recruits workers 
from Southeast Asia or South Asia has ratified either C97 or C143.19 Furthermore, 
although C189 implores member states to protect migrant domestic workers against 
abusive practices by private employment agencies, not one of the major labour-export 
states of Southeast Asia or South Asia, or labour-import states for that matter, has ratified 
the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (C181).  
 
 
The Reorientation of the ILO Project: From Standards to Principles? 
The ILO has been very cognizant of this weakness in its constitution, and has 
responded by concentrating its organisational energies on trying to engage member states 
to embrace non-binding principles, and towards this end has lobbied and assisted 
members to develop measures to regulate employment. A noteworthy illustration of this 
strategy was the formulation of the Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-
binding Principles and Guidelines for a Rights-based Approach to Labour Migration 
concluded in 2006. Even though the Multilateral Framework has no legal force, very few 
member states have engaged with it.  
In many respects the shift from the concern with designing, negotiating and 
promoting employment standards to that of promoting non-binding principles simply 
reflects the extent to which the organisational force of the ILO has been overshadowed by 
the neoliberal agendas pushed by the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. Confronted 
by the dynamics of globalisation, and especially the liberalisation of international trade in 
goods and services, of investment and financial flows, as well as the increased significance 
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of international labour mobility, the Organization felt compelled to explore how to 
recuperate its relevance as an institution involved in shaping employment relations. 
Given the associated turn among member states away from strengthening employment 
relations regulation, there may have been little option to move away from formulating, 
and trying to win support for, a broad range of employment standards that prescribed 
rights and protections. Developing an agenda that was not openly at odds with the 
resistance to this largely explains the ILO’s decision to adopt the vaguer notion of ‘decent 
work’ to spearhead the reorientation (Alston 2004; Standing 2008).  
As this reorientation in focus has translated into the migrant worker rights-based 
agenda, the more it reads like the abandonment of endeavours to establish global 
standards. The ‘rights-based approach’ to international migration concedes the right of 
sovereign states to develop their own policies to manage labour migration (ILO 2010: 
253). The approach does make the case for the ILO assisting states in this enterprise, 
guided by the principles of relevant ILO Conventions. But the emphasis is on guidance 
and not adherence to principles. Rather than progressing employment regulations and 
standards within the Convention framework, the endeavour is premised on promoting 
the rights-based approach outside the ILO’s formal organisational reach. More emphasis 
is placed on member states engaging with social partners and collaborating with one 
another on inter-state collaboration and governments working in partnership with 
migrant worker advocacy groups, although, as noted, this has not proved particularly 
effective in progressing the rights of migrant domestic workers.   
 
 
Conceding the Bounds of Segmented International Labour Markets? 
C189 recognises the significant contribution of domestic workers to the global 
economy and the potential for the continued growth of the migrant domestic labour 
force. By implication C189 endorses the prospect of this and does so subject to 
promoting measures that would provide for the effective protection of the human rights 
of migrant workers and to meeting the ILO’s objective of ‘decent work’ based on an 
‘orderly and equitable process of labour migration’ (ILO 2010: 263). However, it is 
questionable whether the reach of the Convention is sufficient to combat the structural 
inequities in the international domestic worker labour market. Several critical 
shortcomings are evident. 
C189 is a significant development insofar as it expressly acknowledges that many 
of the predominantly women who are employed in domestic work, including the many 
migrant women, ‘are particularly vulnerable to discrimination in respect of conditions of 
employment and work, and to other abuses of human rights,’ and that ‘discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation,’ should be eliminated and that ‘remuneration is 
established without discrimination based on sex’ (Article 3, Article 11). Yet this is an 
occupation that is overwhelmingly defined in terms of gender and unlikely to change. 
Employment ‘based on sex’ is an essential aspect of the job as it has been constructed. 
Moreover, it is not just the gender/sex attribute that frames the definition of domestic 
work in its global context. Race and ethnicity, nationality and religion are also critical in 
the making of the migrant domestic worker. A combination of attributes positions these 
workers in the lower rungs of a highly segmented global labour market. One other 
12 
 
obvious manifestation of this is the extent to which there is a hierarchy with 
remuneration rates and conditions of employment that varies according to race, ethnicity 
and religious orientation and national origin irrespective of the levels of experience (ILO 
2010).20 The labour market hierarchy is even evident in host states that have legislated 
minimum conditions for all foreign domestic workers irrespective of origin, such as in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan where employment regulations do not prevent some worker 
cohorts from being employed on inferior terms to their counterparts. C189 does not 
contest this, and indeed it may be argued contributes to institutionalising the hierarchy of 
the global labour force. 
The layering of this global division of labour has been deepened with ever-new 
sources of labour as economic malaise in the global South drives women to seek work 
overseas. In the more recent instances of states across Southeast Asia and South Asia 
supporting labour migration to boost export revenue, the women recruited from these 
economies enter the global workforce at the bottom of the ladder, are paid lower wages 
and are subject to more exploitative employment conditions than, say, Filipina workers. 
It was precisely this situation that frustrated the Nepalese government when negotiating 
the employment of Nepali women to Malaysia. The problem is systemic insofar as 
international competition for labour market share in the World Bank scenario diminishes 
the ability of labour-export states, migrant worker groups and the ILO to establish 
minimum terms and conditions of employment for the global worker. And all efforts to 
establish internationally-agreed labour codes of conduct and standards outside the ILO 
have also failed (Alston 2004; Taylor 2011).  
Another structural feature of this global labour market is the lack of labour 
market freedom that the Convention does not really counter. This is evident in the near 
universal practice of resident and work visas for employment in low-skilled occupations, 
including domestic work, being issued on the condition that migrants have a contract to 
work for a particular employer. The ability of migrants to exercise any choice in selecting 
an employer to work for is quite restricted when employment is organised through 
agencies. This lack of market freedom is exacerbated by the very limited right of workers 
to terminate contracts with an employer and negotiate alternative employment without 
forfeiting the residence and work visa placing workers in an extremely poor bargaining 
position. C189 (Article 9) points to measures to support the freedom to contract, but this 
would not prevent the limited contractual rights. The vulnerable contractual position of 
workers is evident in the potential for the terms and conditions of mutually-agreed 
employment contracts to be unilaterally varied by a placement agency or an employer 
upon the worker’s arrival at the place of employment, and C189 (Articles 7, 8 and 15) 
afford some protection from this abuse, although it is doubtful that these clauses will be 
fully acted upon when not one of the governments of the major foreign domestic labour-
export or labour-import countries has ratified the Private Employment Agencies 
Convention (C181) which is designed to regulate the recruitment industry. C189 does 
not address the problem of bonded labour, a not uncommon phenomenon that arises 
because workers have to borrow funds to meet the cost of their recruitment and 
placement. While Article 9 proscribes the confiscation of workers’ travel and identity 
documents, the Convention does not contest the practice of what is, in effect, an 
indenture, and this institutionalises labour market disadvantage. The ILO is well aware of 
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the potentially abusive consequences of this arrangement, and especially the kafala system 
as noted, but the practice of tied employment appears well entrenched and unlikely to be 
abandoned in any of the major labour-import economies.   
The disadvantage of tied-employment is compounded by the fact that migrant 
domestic workers are employed overwhelmingly on limited-term contracts.  The duration 
of contracts is generally restricted to two to three years, varying from one country to 
another, and workers are usually required to return to their country of origin before 
renewing or striking a contract with a different employer, and this makes for a precarious 
existence. During the course of my research I met women who had been in continuous 
employment on successive contracts in Hong Kong for many years, living most of their 
lives in Hong Kong, but are denied the range of civil and political rights that go with 
permanent residence or citizenship. Interestingly, some migrant workers have recently 
tested the right of the administration to refuse those with an extended residence history 
from applying for permanent residence. Several long-term resident Filipina domestic 
workers challenged the ‘right of abode’ law in the courts and applied for permanent 
residence. In September 2011 Hong Kong’s First Court of Instance (FCI) determined 
that legislation restricting foreign domestic workers from qualifying for permanent 
residence contravened the Hong Kong Basic Law. The glimmer of hope that this 
institutional obstacle could be dismantled was extinguished when the government 
successfully appealed this determination (Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants 2011).21  
The overturning of the FCI’s ruling was based on the state’s right to exercise 
immigration controls. The Court of Appeal’s ‘Mr Justice Andrew Cheung Kui-nung 
wrote in the judgement: “It is a fundamental principle of international law that a 
sovereign state has the power to admit, exclude and expel aliens. The difference of 
treatment flows inevitably from the fact of the political boundaries which are drawn 
across the globe”’ (Chiu and Lau 2012). Rather than fitting the criterion of ‘ordinarily 
resident’, which was the basis of the worker’s application, the Court of Appeal 
determined that these foreign domestic  workers’ residence was not ‘ordinary’ but ‘very 
special’, and that the legislature had the authority to define or change the meaning of 
‘ordinarily resident’.22   
  The Domestic Worker Convention does nothing to contest the restriction on 
residency, and given its place in the international political system based on regard for 
national sovereignty there was obviously very little possibility that negotiations would 
ever challenge the right of labour-import states to regulate who can and cannot be issued 
with visas and the terms of those visas. The absence of any direction on residence rights 
within the Convention accommodates the concerns of labour-import nations that this 
particular workforce cohort should not be granted permanent resident rights. There is 
nothing in C189 that affords the worker any protection from the vulnerability of 
temporariness, and Article 8 (4) in effect sanctions temporariness by speaking to the 
entitlement for repatriation upon the expiry of an employment contract.  
A further aspect of the international labour market that has been highlighted here 
is the vulnerable and subordinate position of domestic workers who are undocumented. 
C189 explicitly refers to affording measures to improve the position of undocumented 
workers or, as the ILO describes such workers ‘migrant workers in irregular status’ (ILO 
2010: 31). Interestingly, this analysis of irregular migration is little more than descriptive 
14 
 
and provides no real direction for how this phenomenon should be addressed beyond 
framing responses in terms of managing trafficking and smuggling. In some respects, this 
lacuna reflects the inability to get around the resistance to achieving any support from 
employer groups, member states and even worker representatives for establishing 
measures to regularise and afford some protections for undocumented workers. 
Undocumented or irregular migration has become a significant feature of the 
international labour market for domestic work, reinforcing the extent to which it is 
organised in the shadows of the economy, and underscoring the subordinate and 
vulnerable position of migrant domestic workers. While C189’s silence on the subject 
means that undocumented workers are not excluded from the protections afforded 
domestic workers in general, the silence means that any positive steps are wholly 
contingent upon the volition of host states.  
Of course, the ILO is not the cause of the labour market structure that locks 
migrant domestic workers into subordinate and precarious positions in the global 
economy. Perhaps, as some critics have argued, in the interests of getting agreement on 
advancing some rights for migrant workers and not foreclosing employment 
opportunities it is necessary to concede forsaking some rights (Bell and Piper 2005; Ruhs 
and Martin 2008). This echoes the World Bank’s contention that measures to strengthen 
labour market regulations would impede the free movement of labour and restrict the 
economic opportunities for overseas employment (World Bank 2006). The problem here 
is that the negotiations are premised on trying to strike a balance between employment 
rights and less favourable terms and conditions that make attractive the employment of 
migrant domestic workers, and this has resulted in the making of a Convention that is 
both weak and which reflects and institutionalises the systemic labour market inequities. 
There is one further critical aspect of this process worthy of consideration. The 
Convention is primarily concerned with securing the global labour market for migrant 
domestic workers and affording greater protection for these workers. This is to be 
applauded, but in the process the focus is concentrated on setting some minimum 
employment standards, promoting decent work for wage labour, while the broader 
project of enhancing these workers’ human rights tends to be marginalised. Many of the 
worker rights that are advocated in other conventions and which implant human rights, 
including the UN Convention on the Protection of all Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families, are effectively abandoned. This is evident in the absence of any measures 
in C189 that would afford family or civil rights and in the concessions that sanction 
restrictions on mobility.     
 
 
Beyond the ILO and the Struggle for Migrant Domestic Worker Rights? 
I do not want to dismiss C189 out of hand. It is an important institutional 
development in its own right insofar as it acknowledges the feminisation of international 
labour migration and, with this, the marked growth in the employment of foreign 
domestic workers. C189 marks a critical stage in the endeavour to both recognise what is 
distinct about, and the need to regulate, paid domestic work. In outlining some 
minimum desired conditions and standards of employment and linking these to 
recognising employment rights for domestic workers, the C189 brings in from the cold a 
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category of work that hitherto has been excluded from the protection afforded by almost 
all other ILO work and migrant-worker related Conventions.  
It is folly to assume that ILO officials and those interest groups that campaigned 
for the Convention were not cognizant of the limitations of the ILO and more 
particularly the Conventions. For example, at first sight there does not seem to be any 
logic in negotiating a clause such as Article 15 that would protect migrant workers from 
abuse by employment agencies when no labour-export or labour-import country has 
ratified C181. Yet, such a clause does provide the possibility for those lobbying and 
pressing governments to adopt regulations to establish employment rights and 
protections to exercise some leverage. More generally, C189 makes more concrete a 
platform for the advocacy of migrant domestic worker rights; it engenders the possibility 
for injecting more momentum into the struggles to enhance worker protection and 
rights. Some heart can be taken from the tenor of the debate on the wording of the 
Convention because member states within the International Labour Conference were 
generally quite supportive. There are at least a dozen countries that have already ratified 
moving to ratify the Convention,23 while there are a number of governments that already 
have in place regulations governing waged domestic work.  
  There is, in fact, something in this possibility of C189 being a springboard for 
building on the campaign for migrant domestic worker rights especially when it comes 
into force in 2013. Migrant worker organisations, civil society groups, trade unions and 
international organisations have embarked on a concerted campaign to press 
governments in both host and origin countries to adopt the Convention (IDWN 2012; 
SOLIDAR 2012). There have been innumerable celebrations organised which have 
sought to consolidate the momentum of the struggle, including those on International 
Migrants Day in December 2011 and International Women’s Day actions in March 
2012 that were held throughout the world. The organised labour movement has 
embraced with unparalleled determination the cause to have the Convention ratified. 
The International Trade Union Confederation joined by several partners – including the 
IDWN, the IUF, the European Trade Union Confederation and SOLIDAR – have 
launched the ‘12 by 12’ campaign that has focused on winning the support of twelve 
governments to be among the first to ratify the Convention in 2012. This is an 
extraordinarily determined campaign that could have some traction.  
However, the promise of this needs to be tempered by the evidence that the 
goodwill displayed by member states in the drafting deliberations will not necessarily 
translate into concrete policies. There have been some positive outcomes, although these 
have occurred outside the C189 framework, as noted. It is also evident that, 
notwithstanding public endorsements of C189, many member states are unlikely to ratify 
the Convention; progress in extending domestic worker protections and rights will 
necessarily depend on the political purchase of the campaign being spearheaded by the 
ITUC. And it is possible that this was anticipated by the ILO. C189 supplementary 
Recommendations (Recommendation 23) exhort the member states involved in the 
promotion of workers for overseas employment and recruit foreign domestic workers 
labour to negotiate bilateral, regional or multilateral agreements to underwrite the 





The structural pressures that have driven the turn to labour migration place 
migrant workers in a vulnerable position in the global labour market. This vulnerability is 
compounded in the instance of women employed in domestic work because of its nature. 
The Domestic Worker Convention aims to draw this work out of the shadows and 
provide these workers with employment rights comparable to other employment 
occupations while supplementing these with standards that recognise ‘the special 
conditions under which domestic work is carried out’ (C189).  
However, as much as C189 is to be applauded, and notwithstanding its 
shortcomings, the uncertainty that there will be any significant take-up by member states, 
as well as the general inability to enforce the provisions of the instrument does not imbue 
much confidence that C189 will deliver any substantial improvements in employment 
protections and rights for domestic workers. This may explain why Sri Lanka and 
Indonesia have responded to persistent reports of abuses and to criticisms that they are 
not doing enough to protect workers by announcing changes to labour-export programs 
with a view to reducing or ending the migration of women for domestic work (Hangzo 
and Cook 2012; Rosewarne 2012; Wibisono 2012).24  
The challenge is not simply one that exists because of institutional weaknesses. It 
also follows from the limitations that then present in the efforts to promote a set of 
standards designed to deliver ‘decent work’ for migrant domestic workers. The problem 
has another source in the structural inequities that define the global political economy. 
The solutions which the governments of the global South in Southeast Asia and South 
Asia, with the encouragement of several international organisations, are pursuing in order 
to address their economic malaise – promoting labour migration to generate remittances, 
rectify external imbalances and boost capital stocks – simply transfer the economic and 
social pressures to another arena. Reorienting domestic labour resources to promote 
participation in the global labour market as a means of addressing domestic economic 
crises simply displaces the crises, and the structural inequities become embedded in the 
market, in the failure of the global labour market to provide ‘decent work’. The promised 
benefits from developing labour-export programs on the basis of the supposed 
comparative advantage in low-skilled women’s labour are undermined by the intensifying 
competition as more countries are drawn to this strategy and as economic and personal 
circumstances drive women into pursuing employment through irregular channels, on 
the one hand, and the exercise of national sovereignty and reluctance of host nation states 
to deliver ‘decent work’ for temporary migrant workers. 
The Convention does provide a number of in-principle foundations on which to 
pursue the employment rights of migrant domestic workers, most notably in its anti-
discrimination provisions that advocate comparable rights to the citizens and permanent 
residents of the host nation. Some critics have argued that there are a number of measures 
that would not be too controversial which could be adopted to extend the rights of 
migrant workers, such as regularising the employment of workers through circular 
migration (Vertovec 2007). Another proposal is to make certain worker entitlements 
internationally portable, such as could be done with employment-related social security 
contributions, pension and/or health benefits (Piper 2007). However, these measures 
suffer from some of the shortcomings identified with C189. While they would go some 
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way to promoting migrant domestic workers’ human rights, they do not address a 
number of key hallmarks of human rights, and particularly those associated with 
permanent residence such as family and political rights. The regularisation of residence 
and employment status, as has occurred in some European Union member-state 
countries, is one of the very few ways in which the shortcomings can be addressed.    
Any substantive legal and material strengthening of migrant domestic worker 
rights is obviously going to have to rely on the force and effectiveness of the political 
pressure brought to bear by advocacy groups, migrant worker organisations and civil 
society organisations, in conjunction with the organised labour movement, and this in 
turn will be shaped by the strength of transnational and international lobbying and 
campaigning. But this struggle will still have to confront an international organisational 
architecture that, when it comes to labour rights, privileges the sovereign authority of the 
nation-state. Even then the movement will have to tackle the structural inequities across 
the global economy that prompt governments to promote labour-export policies and the 
economic conditions that drive women to migrate, through regular and regulated 
channels as well as clandestinely. This will necessitate challenging the market forces 
which inject the competitive urge to contain the cost of employing foreign domestic 
workers, retard the terms and conditions, and act to systemically fetter efforts to redress 
the labour market disadvantage of the global woman worker. The effectiveness of the 
campaign for decent work for domestic workers will be contingent upon reining in the 
competitive imperatives that frame the global labour market and on countering the 
institutional restrictions on foreign domestic workers that circumscribe their ability to 
exercise all of their industrial and human rights in the employing nations, and, by and 
large, these cannot be readily pursued through the auspices and machinery of the ILO.       














1.  The Domestic Worker Convention includes in its cross-referencing, for instance, the 
Migration for Employment Convention (C 97), the Migrant Workers (Supplementary 
Provisions) Convention (C143), Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (C 
156), the International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, the International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, and International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Their Families.    
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2.  One notable exception was Britain’s Transport and General Workers’ Union which 
supported the Filipino migrant worker groups (Schwenken 2005).     
 
3.  Filipino migrant worker organisations, such as the Commission for Filipino Migrant 
Workers (CFMW), BABAYLAN Philippine Women’s Network in Europe, and ‘Rights, 
Equality, Solidarity, Power, Europe, Co-operation, Today (RESPECT), have been the 
most dynamic, partly reflective of the more robust civil society and partly because many 
activists were political refugees having fled the Marcos regime. Women from some 
Eastern European countries were reluctant to join such movements because they did not 
want to be identified with low-status work.    
 
4.  For example, the Singaporean government proscribes any foreign involvement in civil 
society, which has resulted in some local efforts to provide support for Filipina migrant 
workers drawing on informal networks based in the Philippines.       
 
5.  The list of publications in the field is voluminous.  
 
6.  This was made quite clear when I was conducting my field research, which was very 
ably facilitated by interviewees who were only too helpful in introducing me to peers.     
 
7.  UNIFEM has or is conducting empowerment programs throughout much of 
Southeast and South Asia and in some Middle Eastern states. 
 
8.  The International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco 
and Allied Workers.   
 
9.  Interestingly, in order to placate criticisms that not enough was being done to protect 
Cambodian women from being abused, the Malaysian National Association of 
Employment Agencies (Pikap) joined the Association of Cambodian Recruitment 
Agencies in offering to set up shelters for domestic workers who want to escape 
mistreatment at the hands of their Malaysian employers (Aruna 2011).  
 
10.  Indonesia had banned foreign domestic worker migration to Malaysia following 
reports of a series of abuses. The ban was lifted after Indonesia finalised a bilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding with Malaysia, and Cambodia is presently negotiating a 
similar agreement in similar circumstances (Aruna 2011; Nie 2012).  Indonesia drew up 
a list of Singaporean agencies that were banned from negotiating the recruitment of 
workers with their Indonesian counterparts (Tan 2012). 
    
11.  In fact, the failure of these particular governments to effectively implement labour 
migration restrictions forced them to lift restrictions on the migration of women workers.    
 
12.  The Malaysian government, for example, advised employers that it had every 
confidence that the Indonesian government’s decision to ban the issue of exit visas for 
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workers seeking employment in Malaysia would have little impact on the flow of 
workers.   
 
13.  Indonesia, for example, has threatened to re-impose the ban on the flow of domestic 
workers to Malaysia following reports of further abuses (Nie 2012). It is also widely 
acknowledged that MOUs do not offer as much protection as they promise because 
‘contract substitution’ is a common practice, and one criticism of the Domestic Workers 
Convention is that this is not explicitly proscribed (CARAM 2011; UFDWRs 2011).  
 
14.  Qatar has signalled its intention of dropping the sponsorship system and adopting a 
contract recruitment system (Asian Tribune, 6 May 2012). 
 
15.  The governments of labour-export economies are also moved to seek out new 
sources of labour as migrant workers explore more rewarding destinations for work (Looi, 
S. Goha, L and Raman, A. 2009; Nee 2011).  
 
16.  Bangladeshi women were the lowest paid domestic workers.  
 
17.  The non-ILO members included representatives from Human Rights Watch, 
Migrant Forum in Asia, International Christian Young Workers and Defence for 
Children International. The IUF representative was a domestic worker.   
 
18.  The principle mechanisms intended to draw domestic workers into the mainstream 
include for those member states that ratify the Convention: the right to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining; the specification of the terms and conditions of 
employment, and that these be set out in the job offer or contract of employment; 
entitlement to fair terms of employment as well as decent working conditions; access to 
industrial courts or tribunals or other dispute resolution procedures, and; protection from 
abusive practices and freedom from discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation. Some employment concerns more specific to migrant workers are also 
addressed, including the requirement that contracts of employment be provided prior to 
crossing borders, the right to retain their travel and identity documents, protection from 
abuse by recruitment agencies, and implores members to ‘cooperate with each other to 
ensure effective protection of migrant domestic workers’ (Articles 7, 9 and 16).  
 
19.  Cyprus, Italy and Spain, the most significant European employment locations for 
Filipina and Sri Lankan domestic workers, have ratified C97, and only Cyprus and Italy 
have ratified C143. These are among the minority of EU member states that have ratified 
the Migration for Employment Convention and only four the Migrant Workers 
(Supplementary Provisions) Convention. Neither Canada nor the USA have ratified the 
Conventions. 
 
20.  In countries that issue temporary employment permits for foreign domestic workers, 
the evidence points to a quite well defined hierarchy of remuneration and conditions of 
employment that varies according to race and ethnicity, nationality and religion.   
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21.  The much celebrated case was brought by Ms Evangeline Banao Vallejos, who had 
worked in Hong Kong since 1986, and contended that she was eligible to apply for 
permanent residence. Vallejos appealed a previous determination that she was not eligible 
to apply for permanent residence or a Hong Kong Permanent Identity Card. The judicial 
review has found in her favour. The ruling by the First Court of Instance was not the first 
instance of a determination granting resident rights to a foreign domestic worker, 
although it is the first to grant permanent residence. Hong Kong’s First Court of 
Instance’s Justice Johnson Lam, who heard Ms Vallejos’s appeal, had previously granted 
‘unconditional stay’ to the Filipino Daniel Domingo, who have lived in Hong Kong 
since the 1980s, and Irene Raboy Domingo and their three children who were born in 
Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, which historically has been a 
strong advocate of foreign domestic worker rights, criticised the FCI ruling arguing that 
awarding permanent residence rights to low-status migrant workers could have 
deleterious labour market implications for the broader work force (Hunt 2012). 
 
22.  Hong Kong’s the Immigration Ordinance expressly excludes foreign domestic 
workers from applying for permanent residence rights. Following Hong Kong’s handover 
to China, the administration amended the Hong Kong Immigration Ordinance to 
explicitly exclude four classes of persons from the definition of ordinary resident: foreign 
contract workers under labour importation schemes, ‘foreign domestic helpers’, consular 
staff in Hong Kong, and members of the People’s Liberation Army Garrison.   
 
23.  These include: Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Norway, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, and Uruguay. However, many of the countries 
that did support the resolution of C189 are unlikely to ratify it.  
 
24.  The announcement by Indonesia’s Manpower Transmigration Minister, Muhaimin 
Iskander, that in the face of continuing reports of abuse, Indonesia has developed the 
Domestic Worker Roadmap 2017 to end migration followed action brought by domestic 
workers’ rights activists (by the Action Committee on Domestic Workers, an umbrella 
group representing 162 activist organisations and individuals) against the government for 
failing to protect the country’s ‘maids’ (sic) at home and abroad – and failing to ratify the 
conventions on migrant workers – was dismissed in the Central Jakarta District Court 
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